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1Abstract
The paper examines a delegated monitoring problem between investors and a bank holding a portfolio
of correlated loans displaying “contagion.” Moral hazard prevents the bank from monitoring continuously
unless it is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. The asset pool is liquidated when
losses exceed a state-contingent cut-oﬀ rule. The bank bears a relatively high share of the risk initially, as it
should have high-powered incentives to monitor, but its long term ﬁnancial stake tapers oﬀ as losses unfold.
Liquidity regulation based on securitization can replicate the optimal contract. The sponsor provides an
internal credit enhancement out of the proceeds of the sale and extends protection in the form of weighted
tranches of collateralized debt obligations. In compensation the trust pays servicing and rent-preserving
fees if a long enough period elapses with no losses occurring. Rather than being detrimental, well-designed
securitization seems an eﬀective means of implementing the second best.
Mots clés : Credit risk transfer, Default Risk, Contagion
Classiﬁcation JEL : G21, G28, G32
Résumé
Le papier examine un problème de délégation de contrôle entre des investisseurs et une banque détenant
un portefeuille de prêts corrélés avec risque de “contagion.” La banque est sujette à aléa moral et n’exerce
pas de surveillance en temps réel à moins d’être dédommagée par un contrat incitatif approprié. Les actifs
sont liquidés quand les pertes dépassent un seuil contingent. La banque assume au départ une part signi-
ﬁcative du risque, pour avoir de fortes incitations à surveiller, mais son implication ﬁnancière s’atténue avec
l’accumulation des pertes. Une régulation de la liquidité fondée sur la titrisation permet de mettre en place le
contrat optimal. L’arrangeur apporte un rehaussement de crédit ﬁnancé sur le produit de la vente et fournit
sa protection sous forme d’un portefeuille pondéré de tranches de titres adossés sur dette. En contrepartie,
la société émettrice ad hoc verse des commissions de gestion et de rendement si un temps suﬃsamment long
s’écoule sans incidents. Loin d’être préjudiciable, une titrisation bien conçue semble un moyen eﬃcace de
mettre en place l’optimum de deuxième rang.
Keywords: Transfert du risque de crédit, Risque de défaut, Contagion
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, G28, G32
21 Introduction
Banks develop specialized monitoring skills on behalf of investors in exchange for investors’ ability to fund
their lending activies. Failure to commit adequate monitoring results in low credit standards, which can
ultimately jeopardize ﬁnancial stability. This buy-side agency problem can be felt acutely if loan losses
are the result of contagious defaults when fundamentals go wrong. The focus of the paper is on how the
contractual arrangements between banks and investors interact with banks’ strategic behavior in determining
credit standards and long term risk sharing when contagion is present.
One novel feature of the approach is to show that the delegated monitoring problem between a bank and
risk-neutral investors can best be viewed in the context of asset-backed securities (ABS). In principle, the
deﬁnition of ABS refers to a discrete pool of assets that self-liquidate under the passive purview of the trust
in whose name the ABS are issued. If such were the case, static information about the timing and amount
of expected payments would be enough to determine the performance of the pool, and there would barely
be any servicing or management function to describe. However, the complex nature of ABS transactions
introduces a lot of ﬂexibility to administer the pool. One reason is that the pool may contain up to 50% of
delinquent assets and compliance with the servicing agreement for the transaction is critical. Another is that
active management of the pool is possible through the use of master trusts, prefunding periods or revolving
periods, so that asset substitution becomes possible within certain limits.
While regulatory authorities have adopted speciﬁcally designed disclosure requirements to meet investors’
concerns and foster transparency in ABS markets, the scope for moral hazard on the part of the servicer
can be as important to the performance of the pool as its initial composition and characteristics. The
second-best arrangement arrived at in the paper is consistent with the increasing realization laid out in the
Federal Register (2005) and other references given herein (e.g., Section IIIB) that the servicing role in ABS
transactions materially impacts the performance of the pool. We call such a role over the life of a porfolio
of loans – including collection and management functions – “continuous monitoring.”
To shed light on the dynamic delegated monitoring problem, we start with a stylized model where the
bank may engage in unobservable actions that result in private beneﬁts at the expense of performance.
3We abstract from imperfect commitment problems and focus on moral hazard in risk prevention. More
speciﬁcally, the bank can make a costly eﬀort at any point in time to handle delinquent loans or manage its
asset pool eﬃciently, in which case the portfolio’s default intensity improves at that time. Given competitive
investors, the goal is to elicit which high-powered compensation maximizes the bank’s payoﬀ subject to a
zero-proﬁt condition for investors and an incentive compatibility condition for continuous monitoring. The
optimal trade-oﬀ between eﬃcient risk sharing and eﬃcient monitoring allows the bank to release as much
costly capital as possible by laying oﬀ some credit risk while maintaining contract enforcement over the loans
throughout.
Although the paper considers a single bank, systemic risk is handled with a model of “contagion.”
The model is Markovian, with individual default intensities depending on the number of non-performing
loans. Consistently with the empirical evidence documented by Laurent at al. (2007), contagious dependence
between defaults is introduced by assuming that the smaller the size of the portfolio, the higher individual
risk. Correlation between default times comes from the fact that individual risk is not idiosyncratic. Each
defaulting loan creates an externality on market participants’ views about the quality of the rest of the
portfolio. When contagion has spread, individual risk is extreme and it seems like losses are lumped together.
To simplify the exposition we consider a static portfolio of identical long term loans yielding constant cash
ﬂows per unit time. The optimal risk prevention policy relies on two instruments: positive payments to the
bank and the threat of stochastic liquidation. In line with the growing literature on dynamic moral hazard,
these decisions are made on the basis of two state variables: the size of the portfolio and the continuation
utility of the bank. While the former reﬂects the total number of losses, the latter summarizes the track
record of performance. The two must be distinguished because the assessment of performance relies on
how quickly the portfolio has unraveled, not how much. We characterize the compensation and stochastic
liquidation policy arising from the optimal contract.
Consider ﬁrst the compensation policy. In order to have the bank work in their best interest, investors
resort to the carrot-and-stick approach. The bank is rewarded when its track record is on target. Two kind
of fees are charged in the “bliss” state. One is the servicing fee for monitoring which is a ﬂat percentage of
4the portfolio size. The other is the rent-preserving fee for impatience which depends on the bank’s discount
rate. When the track record deteriorates, however, payments are suspended. The bank takes stick from
investors through a reduction in its continuation utility as soon as a loss occurs. The magnitude of the
“punishment” is pinned down by the incentive compatibility constraint. In the beginning underlying risk is
low and it is diﬃcult to disentangle a bank which monitors from one which does not. It needs high-powered
incentives and bears the brunt of initial losses. In the end underlying risk is high and the imminence of a
default makes the bank eager to monitor. It is no longer tantalized by the prospect of shirking and better
shielded against the incidence of losses in ﬁnancial distress. Thus, according to this compulsory retention
scheme, the bank’s risk share tapers oﬀ as losses unfold, until the portfolio is exhausted.
Next consider the stochastic liquidation policy. Punishments meted out during compensation deﬁne the
bank’s reservation utility. If the target set in the bliss state comes close to reservation utility, the threat of
reductions has no real bite because the bank is protected by limited liability. To cope with the situation,
investors allow for random liquidation1 of the portfolio upon default, with a probability of survival reﬂecting
the bank’s current performance. The threat of liquidation impels the bank to keep monitoring when its
performance is poor but is socially costly, so investors are keen to keep stochastic liquidation as far as
possible from target. The gap between the best and worst performances for given size deﬁnes a contingent
cut-oﬀ rule. It is the highest permissible level for losses starting from bliss or, more precisely, the maximum
number of joint defaults that the bank is allowed to make without fearing liquidation. Tuning the cut-oﬀ
rule is as eﬀective an instrument to discipline banks as the punisment itself.
To understand the mechanics of the cut-oﬀ rule, recall that once on probation the bank is driven by the
prospect of future payments. As long as there are no losses, payments should be resumed soon and the new
target adjusted to assuage the bank’s desire for fees. In normal circumstances – assuming individual risk
is not noticeably aﬀected – it is not sensible to keep the bank waiting with the promise of larger payments
since underlying conditions have not changed. The reason for actually reducing payments is twofold. First,
1An alternative threat against a non-performing bank would be downsizing the portfolio. Although this would achieve
essentially the same outcome, the implementation might be more diﬃcult if loans are indistinguishable. Recurrent downsizing
could also be viewed as more disruptive.
5the bank’s compensation should not improve in size-adjusted terms and the portfolio has decayed by one
unit. Second, the bank’s risk shifting incentives should be held in check and losses are slightly less frequent,
making shirking more diﬃcult to detect. On both accounts, investors’ best reaction is to lower the target
by strengthening the cut-oﬀ rule. Thus, looking forward from the preceding state, the well-performing bank
knows that it will lose after a loss even if it does not have to wait long and remains diligent.
But there is a twist. Individual risk may surge in rare circumstances. It is then that the bank’s special
skills at collecting loan payments are most valuable. The aggregate loss intensity soars despite the reduction
in portfolio size and dwarfs the bank’s own discount rate, making the cost of performance appear relatively
cheap. Investors’ best reaction is to rescale the number of permissible losses to take the new conditions into
account, i.e., slacken the cut-oﬀ rule. By this token, heightened concerns about underlying risk induce an
abrupt fall in reservation utility, but their impact on the target is dampened. Again looking forward from
the preceding state, the well-performing bank knows that it will have to wait a long time before payments
are resumed if it comes to operate under turbulence and so remains diligent.
Interestingly, the optimal prevention policy can be implemented through a true sale transaction when
changes in underlying risk are lumpy. To this extent the complex institutions involved in structured ﬁnance
can sow the seeds of their salvation. More speciﬁcally, the sponsoring bank sells its portfolio to a trust
and guarantees the deal by returning the capital required and gain on sale to a reserve account managed
by the trust. The internal credit enhancement is used as cash collateral to reimburse the trust for losses
following tranches of protection matching the bank’s optimal risk shares. Fees accrue on the reserve account
to increase credit support and are remitted when the balance is on target. In contrast, premium spreads are
retained by the trust as a liquidity tax prepaid by the sponsoring bank for the systemic risk it creates. The
idea is that movements in the reserve account balance faithfully mirrors the bank’s performance and can be
used by the trust to trigger stochastic liquidation. The result shows that, with continuous monitoring, the
optimal tradeoﬀ between risk sharing and monitoring is consistent with separating diﬀerent functions in the
production process, with origination and servicing on the one hand, and activities related to securitization
on the other.
6The paper belongs to the recent and fertile literature on dynamic moral hazard, as illustrated by DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a, 2007b), Biais et al. (2007) or Sannikov (2008). Many
papers deal with frequent and inﬁnitesimal risk, but Sannikov (2005) also has Poisson risk. A diﬀerence is that
jumps are associated with upside cash-ﬂow shocks, which leads to predictable downsizing and qualitatively
diﬀerent results. In Biais et al. (2009), moral hazard is about large and infrequent risks. As in our model and
unlike in the Brownian case, investors inﬂict sharp reductions in the agent’s continuation utility when losses
occur and unpredictable downsizing when performance is poor. Firm size dynamics is markedly diﬀerent
because the agent can expand through investment and follow asymptotically a positive growth trend. In
contrast ABS refer to a discrete pool of assets that eventually ceases to exist. Our analysis oﬀers a ﬁrst
description of unpredictable downsizing in a non-stationary context.
The paper is related to several other strands of literature. One deals with the importance of forward
monitoring in banking using continuous ﬂow of information. Peeking at the checking account balance or
ﬁnancial statements helps banks monitor outstanding loans as outlined in Norden and Weber (2008). Dichev
and Skinner (2001) argue that banks set loan covenants very tight and use them to work with borrowers
behind on payments, possibly extending grace periods and paring fees or interest rates to minimize losses.
There is also evidence about the importance of servicers in securitization. Ashcraft and Shuermann (2008)
show that the servicer’s role is not conﬁned to the collection and remittance of loan payments and carries
important responsibilities, like maintenance of property, hazard insurance and tax bills when the loan starts
being delinquent or like prompt foreclosure once deemed uncollectible. These activities have consequences
for the distribution of cash ﬂows, with an impact of plus or minus 10 percent on losses according to one
Moody’s estimate. Gan and Mayer (2006) discuss the role of the “special servicer” who is responsible for
the borrower work-out and foreclosure functions. They ﬁnd that when they hold the ﬁrst-loss piece, special
servicers appear to behave more eﬃciently, with a positive impact on the price of junior tranches. In Cantor
and Hu (2006), the weaker performance of certain types of sponsors is related to their incentives to economize
on quality servicing or select risky assets.
Several papers examine the implications of credit risk transfer (CRT) for banks’ incentives to monitor that
7recent empirical studies document.2 They generally ﬁnd that CRT has negative repercussions on monitoring
incentives. These results hold against the backdrop of Innes (1990), who shows that under a monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP) debt ﬁnancing maximizes the reward for monitoring. A notable exception
is Chiesa (2008), who departs from MLRP by assuming that the medium performance of a portfolio must
reveal a bank that has monitored in a downturn. In her paper, good performance is always attributed
to good luck and monitoring is only useful in downturns. Fender & Mitchell (2008) extend the model in
various dimensions to focus on the incidence of diﬀerent retention mechanisms on banks’ incentives to screen
borrowers. Here we suggest that the lack of MLRP is not necessary to vindicate CRT. In Arping (2004),
credit derivatives have a positive impact on incentives because they insulate banks from default risk before
maturity and promote early eﬃcient liquidation, which strengthens borrowers’ incentives for eﬀort. A few
papers study how diﬀerent forms of CRT aﬀect the eﬃciency of monitoring. In Duﬀee and Zhou (2001),
introducing credit derivatives promotes risk sharing but undermines the loan-sale market. The eﬀect on
monitoring depends on whether or not there is pooling in the loan-sale market. Parlour and Winton (2008)
consider the value of control rights in the loan-sale market when loan sales and credit derivatives coexist.
They ﬁnd that none of the equilibria can achieve both eﬃcient risk sharing and eﬃcient monitoring. These
papers do not consider partial credit enhancements associated with the provision of continuous monitoring.
Pooling and tranching have been rationalized in the literature, in particular as an incentive for issuers to
acquire inside information about asset values prior to sale. Using the security design model of De Marzo and
Duﬃe (1999), DeMarzo (2005) shows that tranching mitigates an adverse selection problem by allocating
information-insensitive derivative securities to uninformed investors while intermediaries’ retention of junior
tranches signals their superior ability in valuing assets. In a similar vein, Plantin (2004) shows that tranching
is optimal when ﬁnancial institutions diﬀer in their ability to screen collateral and redistribute securities.
A paper close to ours is Franke and Krahnen (2006) who argue that, with payoﬀs indexed to system-wide
macroeconomic shocks, senior tranches are better held by investors with no relationship-speciﬁc information,
while intermediaries’ retention of junior tranches ensures that their risk share increases with the inﬂuence
2See, for example, Berndt and Gupta (2008), Drucker and Puri (2007), Keys et al. (2008).
8they have through monitoring. Interestingly, their results indicate that banks’ securitization activity is
associated with an increase in their systematic risk, not a reduction, which they interpret as the higher
correlation in risk exposures implied by banks reinvesting the proceeds from securitization in new loans with
the same properties as those in their initial books. Duﬃe (2008) uses numerical simulations to show that
the issuer has an incentive to reduce dramatically both the fraction retained and the eﬀort level when the
cost of monitoring is suﬃciently high. The reduction in default intensity through monitoring follows Duﬃe
and Gârleanu (2001) and features a richer set of parameters and controls than in our model. On the other
hand, retention is limited to the equity tranche.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and characterize the optimal
contract under the incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints. Based on this analysis, Section 3
adopts a backward recursive approach to construct the solution of a system of optimal control problems and
derive the dynamics of bank size. Section 4 oﬀers some tentative policy implications before the conclusion in
Section 5. Proofs are simple and left for the reader, except for that of Proposition 3 provided in Appendix.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a bank and many investors. The former has sole rights to the returns of relationship-
speciﬁc loans. It has limited liability, some funds to start with, and derives private beneﬁts from not
conducting due diligence on the loans. The latter have unlimited liability and supply liquidity competitively,
as long as they cover the costs. There is universal risk neutrality and the bank is more impatient than
investors. Investors’ objective is to ﬁnd a contract that maximizes their expected proﬁt subject to the bank
maintaining loan enforcement and getting its reservation utility. Knowing this, the bank will oﬀer investors
a contract that allows it to fetch as much as it can and let them break even.
The bank’s opportunity set consists of I unit loans, the default risk of which has some systematic
component. All loans are ex ante identical and yield   per unit time. The portfolio is static, with no
reinvestment after time zero. However, when a loan gets repaid, it is immediately replaced by a loan with
the same characteristics. Investors can commit to liquidate the pool in case of poor performance, but loans
9are worth nothing if managed outside the bank. This is meant to capture the idea that a bank’s portfolio
illiquidity stems in large part from the bank-customer relationship, implying that the ability to collect loans
rests squarely on the lender’s unique skills at working with borrowers behind on payments or extracting
more concessions from them.
Monitoring is often viewed as the choice of costly eﬀort made by a lender at origination to screen borrowers
in an adverse selection environment. In this paper, we emphasize instead the choice of costly eﬀort dedicated
by one or more servicers during the life of the loans to support a deteriorating performance. For example,
a bank can set debt covenants whose fulﬁllment is then monitored. The Federal Register (2005) shows that
servicing is often quite complex in securitization and can entail a division of responsibilities between several
entities: a “master servicer” oversees the action of other servicers, “primary servicers” are responsible for
primary contact with obligors and collection eﬀorts, “special servicers” are charged with handling borrower
work-out and foreclosure functions, while an “administrator” is entrusted with the dynamic management,
possibly adding new units to the pool from funds set aside or recycled cash ﬂows.
Such dynamic monitoring has two consequences. First, the distinction between the exogenous base
quality of the loan and the endogenous default probability that obtains after the monitoring decision has
taken place arises at each point in time. Second, the cost of monitoring depends on how defaults propagate
in the portfolio. We rely on a homogeneous “contagion” Markov model where the loss intensity of the nth-
to-default loan depends on the size of the pool. We show that, if investors can commit to liquidate loans
before maturity, they will ensure that the bank is diligent by winding down the pool when losses exceed a
state-dependent threshold.
2.1 Dynamic monitoring
Let i = I − Nt be the size of the portfolio3 at time t, where Nt = 0, ..., I is the default count. Downsizing
occurs either as a result of individual defaults or of liquidation by investors. The information Ft is the
natural ﬁltration associated with the default and liquidation times.
3To avoid cumbersome notation, the time index of portfolio size i is systematically suppressed.
10The default count Nt is a controlled time-homogeneous and Markovian process (Karlin and Taylor, 1975).
Under the risk neutral probability, the individual default indicators N
j
t have default intensities depending on
the size of the pool and on the level of bank monitoring. If the bank monitors continuously, default intensities
are αj(t) = αi for the i loans outstanding and zero otherwise. Thus, as long as the bank is diligent and
spared from liquidation risk, the aggregate loss intensity of the pool is λi =
 
j αj(t) = iαi.
Monitoring eﬀort is costly and unobservable to investors. It aﬀects risk only at the time it is exerted. As
in Holmström and Tirole (1997) there are two levels of eﬀort. If the bank chooses to shirk (et = 1), it enjoys
a private beneﬁt B dt per loan between t and t + dt, in which case the aggregate loss intensity, (1 + ǫ)λi, is
higher than what it would be under monitoring (et = 0), uniformy in i.
A contract speciﬁes the amount δt to be paid to the bank and the time τ at which liquidation occurs,
if ever. Liquidation is unpredictable and stochastic, as it takes place only after a loss and depends on the
realization of a lottery. The survival probability given default is denoted by θ, so the pre-liquidation intensity
associated with the indicator Mt = 1{t≥τ} is λi(1+ǫet)(1−θ). The sequence of events is as follows. The size
inherited from the past is i. The bank receives payment δt dt and makes its eﬀort decision et for (t,t + dt).
With probability λi(1 + ǫet)dt there is a loss and the size becomes i − 1. Then the pool is liquidated with
probability 1 − θ. Otherwise the bank keeps administering the pool, with initial size or one less unit.
2.2 Incentive compatibility and limited liability
Let r be the bank’s rate of impatience. The interest rate, including any premium that investors pay for
consuming early, is normalized to zero. As in Sannikov (2008) or Biais et al. (2009), we specify the bank’s
lifetime utility at t as the conditional expected discounted revenue of its activities
Ut = E
   τ
0
e−rs  
δs + 1{es=1}B(I − Ns)
 
ds
      Ft
 
,
11given a contract (δ,τ) and an eﬀort process e. Related to lifetime utility is the bank’s continuation utility
deﬁned as
ut = 1{t≤τ}E
   τ
t
e−r(s−t)  
δs + 1{es=1}B(I − Ns)
 
ds
      Ft
 
. (1)






δs + 1{es=1}B(I − Ns)
 
ds + e−rtut
is a martingale, the integral representation theorem for point processes (Brémaud, 1981) implies that there
are predictable processes4 h1 and h2 such that the bank’s continuation utility satisﬁes the promise-keeping
equation













t (dMt − (1 − θ)λi(1 + etǫ)dt) (2)
until liquidation. The bank’s expected change in continuation utility, net of payments and private beneﬁts,
is equal to r, while h1 and h2 are the sensitivities of utility to individual losses and liquidation, respectively.
We have the following result, in line with Sannikov (2008, Proposition 2).
Proposition 1 Given a contract (δ,τ), the eﬀort process is incentive compatible if and only if
h1
t + (1 − θ)h2




almost surely for all t ∈ [0,τ].
Heuristically, if the bank plans to follow the optimal strategy e = 0 starting from t, it should have no
incentive to deviate before t. From (1), its continuation utility ut is determined by the history of defaults
and the contract (δ,τ) after time t, not by its eﬀort before time t. Given ut, it will not deviate between t−dt
and t if the real change in continuous utility dut−rut dt is lower under monitoring. This yields the incentive
4Since oustanding loans are indistinguishable, we assume w.l.o.g. that h1 is a scalar process.
12compatibility constraint (3). The left-hand side is the predictable loss in utility brought about by default and
liquidation risk. The right-hand side is the minimum rent consistent with monitoring under limited liability.
Indeed, the promise-keeping and incentive compatibility conditions (2) and (3) taken together5 imply that
losses inﬂicted upon default can always be as high as bi. Continuation utility cannot fall below bi.
A high sensitivity to losses requires that the bank be compensated with high utility in the begining.
This reduces investors’ value. Hence, the incentive compatibility binds under the optimal plan. Because
liquidation is ineﬃcient and should be avoided to the extent possible, there are two regimes for the bank.
Either u ≥ bi + bi−1 and there is no need to liquidate the pool (θ = 1). The loss in utility is h1
t = bi and
since u − bi ≥ bi−1 the limited liability constraint is not violated in state i − 1. Or bi ≤ u < bi + bi−1 and
liquidation is necessary. Since all is lost when the pool is jettisoned, the promise-keeping constraint yields
u = h1 + h2. The incentive compatibility constraint in turn determines θ = (u − bi)/(u − h1). But limited
liability has u − h1 ≥ bi−1 when the pool is spared, so θ is maximized when h1 = u − bi−1 and h2 = bi−1.
The optimal survival probability, θ = (u − bi)/bi−1, reﬂects the bank’s position in the interval [bi,bi + bi−1].
If a default occurs, utility is ﬁrst reduced to u − h1 = bi−1, the bank’s reservation utility in state i − 1.
Then a coin is thrown. Heads the bank remains in charge and its utility starts growing. Tails the bank is
dispossessed and bi−1 − h2 = 0.
2.3 Optimal contracting
If h1 = bi ∧ (u − bi−1), h2 = bi−1 and θ = (u − bi)/bi−1 ∧ 1, the contract is incentive compatible. The
promise-keeping equation (2) returns
˙ u + δt = ru + λibi ∧ (u − bi−1) + λi(1 − θ)bi−1
= ru + λibi
5If θ = 1 there is no liquidation and ∆u = −h1 = −h1 − (1 − θ)h2 ≤ −bi. Otherwise −∆u is either h1 (probability θ) or
h1 + h2 (probability 1 − θ). Since max
￿
h1,h1 + h2￿
≥ h1 + (1 − θ)h2 ≥ bi, ∆u ≤ −bi with strictly positive probability.
13between two successive losses. The bank charges two kinds of fees to investors. One shields the bank against
the incidence of losses for which it is not accountable under monitoring. The servicing fee λibi = iB/ǫ is a
ﬂat percentage of the outstanding portfolio. The other maintains the real value of the bank’s continuation
utility. The rent-preserving fee ru is tuned to the rate of impatience.
In this time-homogeneous setup, as in many models of dynamic moral hazard, the current size of the
portfolio i and the bank’s current utility u are suﬃcient statistics for the optimal contract. Investors’
continuation utility, vi(u), satisﬁes the following system of dynamic Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equations
which can be solved recursively from i = 1 to I
max
δt( )
{˙ vi (ru + λibi − δt) + i  − δt − λiθ(vi(u) − vi−1((u − bi) ∨ bi−1) − λi(1 − θ)vi(u)} = 0,
where θ = (u − bi)/bi−1 ∧ 1 is the optimal probability of liquidation given default. The ﬁrst term is the
change in continuation value brought about by the drift in u. The second is the revenue from the loans net
of payment to the bank. The last two correspond to the loss of utility incurred depending on whether the
bank keeps operating or not, respectively. With the extrapolation vi(u) = u/bi v(bi) on u ∈ [0,bi] the HJB
equations can be simpliﬁed as
max
δt( )
{˙ vi (ru + λibi − δt) + i  − δt − λi (vi(u) − θvi−1(u − bi))} = 0.
Movements in u reﬂect the history of individual losses: u keeps increasing towards some target unless
some unexpected default brings it down. The complementary slackness condition δi (˙ vi + 1) = 0 helps explain
why. When u is above target, social surplus u + vi is maximized and ˙ vi = −1. Investors prevent u from
rising above target by paying fees to the bank. Below target ˙ vi > −1 and investors are better oﬀ postponing
payments until the target is reached. A string of unexpected losses can interrupt this process. If u falls
below bi + bi−1 in state i, the bank fears liquidation risk after a loss.
143 Bank size dynamics
With constant returns to scale, the bank’s reservation utility, bi = B/(ǫαi), does not change as long as αi
remains constant. In a stable environment with constant individual risk, the size-adjusted rent B/(ǫλi) rises
despite bad performance at the rate 1/i (which is increasing, since i is decremented by the default count).
Because the aggregate default rate declines with the number of loans outstanding, it becomes increasingly
diﬃcult to disentangle a bank which monitors from one which does not. Its informational rent per unit loan
edges up. In contrast, when bouts of contagion trigger a sharp rise in the underlying default risk, the bank’s
size-adjusted rent falls abruptly. It has less leeway to shirk. We are interested in the implications that such
changes have for the design of the optimal contract.
Contagion between defaults is introduced by assuming that the sequence αi is low in the beginning and
eventually high, i.e., αI ≤ αI−1 ≤     ≤ α1. This imperfect correlation between default times undermines the
bank’s ability to diversify its credit risk and makes the last few loans comparable to “economic catastrophe
bonds” (Coval et al., forthcoming), low in risk unconditionnally but likely to be wiped out if the risk
materializes.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The sequence αi is decreasing (chronologically increasing): αi ≤ αi−1.
Since λi−1/λi ≥ (i − 1)/i, aggregate default intensity mirrors jumps in underlying individual risk and
cannot decrease by more than 1/i if the latter is constant. A special case obtains when individual risk does
not vary with size (local independence). Aggregate default intensity being proportional to size may be high
in the beginning if the spell is long.
Assumption 2 infi≥2 iαi > r.
Aggregate intensity is higher than the bank’s rate of impatience starting from i = I to i = 2.
Assumption 3 There exists k such that k ≤ αi/αi−1 < 1 and w1 =  ǫ/B − (λ1 + r)/λ1 > 1/ln(1 + k/2).
This technical condition requires that the loan revenue be all the higher in proportion of rents, the higher
the maximum increase in individual risk αi−1/αi = 1/k.
153.1 Single loan: Constant utility
Bank’s continuation utility is constant and set at its minimum level u1 = b1. This implies a continuous
payment of δ1 = b1 (r + λ1) until extinction at time τ. Since E
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(  − δ1) ds =
  − δ1
λ1
= b1w1
with w1 as in Assumption 3. Optimal policy is captured by the value function v1(u) = b1w1 (θ) with
θ = (u − b1)/b1 and normalized continuation utility
w1(θ) = w1 − θ,
When u > b1, an immediate payment of u − b1 is made to have the bank fall back on its reservation utility
b1. However, u > b1 is never reached under the optimal plan.
3.2 Two loans: Stochastic liquidation
In the absence of payments until the target is reached, the bank’s continuation utility grows as
˙ u = ru + λ2b2 = ru + 2B/ǫ, u ∈ [b2,b2 + b1).
Investors’ continuation utility v2(u) satisﬁes the following HJB equation
˙ v2 (ru + λ2b2) + 2  − λ2 (v2 − θv1) = 0
where θ = (u − b2)/b1is the survival probability given default. Hence between b1 and b2 there is stochastic
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with i ≥ 2, j < i and the convention b0 = b1.
The free parameter C1







Indeed, it is neither optimal to prevent the bank’s continuation utility from increasing before the survival
probability θ is equal to one, nor to keep it increasing beyond u = b2 + b1. Hence the stochastic liquidation
region is exactly [b2,b2 + b1). In the absence of default, the target u = b2 + b1 is reached, there is no more
risk of stochastic liquidation and the bank receives a continuous payment of δ2 = r(b2 + b1) + 2B/ǫ until
either of the two loans defaults. Its continuation utility then jumps to b1.
Investor’s continuation utility is concave on [b2,b2+b1). This property, as in all solutions of higher order
states, reﬂects the ineﬃciency arising from stochastic liquidation. The principal’s value react strongly to
performance when liquidation is likely and much less so if the track record is good. The function w1
2 also starts
increasing under Assumption 3. The technical condition implies that A2 = λ2/(λ2 − r)w1 > y2/(1 − y2).
6The notation w
j
i(θ) refers to a normalized solution with i loans over the jth interval
￿
bi +     + bi−(j−1),bi +     + bi−j
￿
.
It is deﬁned as w
j








2 and ˙ w1
2(0) = A1
2 − C1






















a result needed just below.
3.3 Three loans: Probation

















3. Anticipating somewhat one can show again that investors’ utility starts increasing. Before the
target is reached one must have ˙ w1






y3. But we have just seen above
that (λ3 − r)/λ3A1







3 and ˙ w1
3(0) = A1
3 − C1






















a property preserved by induction across all stochastic liquidation intervals of higher order states.
It is no longer optimal to prevent u from exceeding the stochastic liquidation interval. Beyond b3 + b2
the bank must be let out on probation for some time. The bank’s position, θ = (u3 − b3 − b2)/b1, is the



















































3 as a function of C2
3. The diﬀerential equations with lags deﬁning the optimal plan have solutions
that are continuously diﬀerentiable. Pasting derivatives ensures that levels adjust.





The ﬁrst condition states that it is no longer cheaper to compensate the bank using future rewards than
an immediate transfer. The second condition is a “smooth pasting” condition ensuring that θ3 is optimal.
Indeed, if w2
3 were strictly concave at θ3, more surplus could be obtained by marginally raising the treshold
beyond that level. Diﬀerentiating the ODE deﬁning φ
2
3 to eliminate ¨ φ
2
3, one ﬁnds after some substitutions
that the critical level θ3 satisﬁes




The size of probation is determined by investors’ marginal utility in the stochastic liquidation interval one
step ahead. By construction the slope of the objective function declines to −1 until θ = 1 so θ3 is certainly
less than one. It turns out in this rather special case that the slope is positive at θ = 0. A positive slope
signals a severe hazard moral problem since a better performance improves both the utility of the principal
and that of the agent. There is thus room for improvement and θ3 is away from zero. All parameters are
then recovered from the boundary condition 1 + ˙ w2
3(θ3) = 0.
The higher the aggregate intensity in state 3, the larger probation. The intuition is the following.
Aggregate default intensity is highest when individual risk remains constant (α3 = α2). But it improves
with the downsizing, making opportunistic behavior more diﬃcult to detect and raising the bank’s size-
adjusted rent in state 2. To restore the bank’s incentives to monitor, investors must raise the stakes by
19lengthening probation and promising a larger payment when the target is reached. Conversely if aggregate
default intensity is expected to deteriorate (λ3 low relative to λ2), the downsizing triggers a large drop in
the bank’s size-adjusted rent. There is no need to provide the bank with high-powered incentives and the
size of probation is smaller.
3.4 Four loans: Backward expansion
The results for i = 4 are similar, except for the possible extension of the target beyond the end of the second





















the boundary θ4 in that interval, if it is an interior solution, is again determined by the pasting conditions
˙ w2
4 = −1 and ¨ w2
4 = 0 leading to





The social value of performance is 1 + ˙ v3(u) one step ahead. The current relative cost of performance is
r/λ4. Whether or not expansion is warranted in state 4 depends on which interval one step ahead has a social
value of performance equal to the current cost. If this happens when v3(u) = b2w1
3(θ), the ﬁrst interval of
state 3, condition (4) is met in the second interval of state 4. Investors want the best performers to be under
threat of stochastic liquidation should a loss occur and there is no need to expand probation. If this happens
when v3(u) = b1w2
3(θ), condition (4) cannot be met because the social value of performance is still high
relative to its cost at b3 + b2. Investors want the best performers to fall in the probation interval of state 3
and this means expanding probation in state 4. In this still rather special case no backward contraction can
take place because there is no interval to pick before stochastic liquidation in state 3. This need not be the
case for higher order states with a large number of intervals. Thus looking forward, contraction is by one
interval at most, but expansion can be sizable.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Suppose i = 4 is a state where “contagion” has spread
20with maximum individual risk (α4 = α3). Looking forward, the bank’s size-adjusted reservation rent grows
by 33% following default (b3/3 = 4/3b4/4). This creates risk shifting incentives when performance is poor.
To mitigate those risks, investors design a long probation interval. As shown below, the size-adjusted target,
and consequently the payment made, are higher. So the size-adjusted reservation rent is improved in the
advent of default, but the punishment is also more severe if the bank shirks in the bliss state.
If on the contrary delinquencies are not likely when there are four loans (α4 < α3), the bank enjoys high
rents in that state and is undermined by the downsizing. There is no need to shrink probation going forward.
In the advent of default the bank has to wangle its way into both the stochastic liquidation and probation
intervals of state 3. The punchline is that, looking forward, the cost of performance r/λ rises slowly during
spells of constant individual risk and small cuts in the probation size hold the bank’s rents in check. In
contrast, the cost of performance dwindles during phases corresponding to a sharp worsening of credit risk
and lump increases in the probation size help restore its incentives to monitor.
If 1 + ˙ v3(b3 + b2) > r/λ4, the smooth pasting condition for the boundary θ4 in the third interval reads





By construction 1+ ˙ w2
3 vanishes at θ = θ3 so θ4 < θ3 for positive r. In the advent of default in the bliss state,
the bank ﬁnds itself within probation and does not get payments for some time. The targets consistent with
the bank being paid in state i = 4 and i = 3 are
γ4 = b4 + b3 + b2 + θ4b1
γ3 = b3 + b2 + θ3b1,
respectively. Since b4 ≥ b3 ≥ b2 ≥ b1, the size-adjusted gap is minimized when all bi are equal, θ4 = 0 and





















21The bank loses when probation contracts, not only in absolute terms, but also in relative terms. This is not
necessarily the case otherwise.
3.5 General case
We can now state the following.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 to 3, the solution of the HJB system of equations
max
δt( )≥0
{˙ vi (ru + λibi − δt) + i  − δt − λi (vi(u) − θvi−1(u − bi))} = 0
s.t. du + δt dt = rudt − bi ∧ (u − bi−1)
  
dNi
t − λi dt
 





has maximal solutions vi(u) over [bi,∞). The functions vi are globally concave, continuously diﬀerentiable,




bi−j + θibi−l(i)−1, θi ∈ [0,1],
is the target rent in state i. On [bi,bi + bi−1) there is stochastic liquidation given default with probability
1 − θ. On [bi,γi) payment is diﬀered. The cut-oﬀ rule l(i) satisﬁes l(i + 1) ≤ l(i) + 1, with l(1) = l(2) = 0
and l(3) = 1. The scale θi is the probability of survival after l(i) + 1 joint defaults in the bliss state, with




are uniquely determined by the recursive conditions










In particular l(i) = i − 2 and θi = 1 if r = 0.
The optimal risk prevention policy relies on two instruments: the prospect of future payments if there is
no loss for some time (the carrot), and the risk of stochastic liquidation if there is a spell of poor performance
22(the stick). This history dependence is summarized by two variables: past downsizing, reﬂected in the number
of loans outsanding i = I − N, and past performance, reﬂected in the bank’s informational rent u. The
minimum rent consistent with monitoring is bi. Given track record u ≥ bi, it makes sense for investors to
encourage the bank to improve its credentials before making payments. To keep the bank participating, they
let its rent grow at a rate consistent with size and rate of impatience. Proposition 2 determines how far the
target γi is away from bi. Once the target is reached, the bank is paid.
Suppose there are i loans outstanding, ordered by the rank in which they default, i.e., number i is the
ﬁrst to default, i − 1 the next and so on. (It does not matter which particular loans are chosen, since they
are identical.) The bottom rent bi is associated with a 100% probability of liquidation given default (θ = 0).
Suppose instead investors depart from the stochastic liquidation rule and commit not to liquidate the bank
if loan i defaults. Incentive compatibility requires ui −bi ≥ ui−1 so bi +bi−1 is the minimum rent consistent
with one exemption from liquidation (l(i) = 1). Likewise, if investors commit to exempt the bank from
liquidation for up to l(i) successive defaults, the bank’s rent immediately jumps to
 l(i)
j=0 bi−j. Hence l(i)
can be interpreted as the cut-oﬀ rule associated with state i. It is the maximum number of joint defaults
that the bank can withstand without fearing liquidation under the best track record.
Under the optimal plan the level of commitment is contingent on the bank’s past performance. If
u ∈ [bi,bi + bi−1), commitment is granted with probability θ = (u − bi)/bi−1. The utility range [bi,γi] can
be broken into l(i) + 1 “buckets” of weakly decreasing size bi−1, ..., bi−l(i), bi−l(i)−1, the last being scaled
down by θi. If u happens to be in the kth bucket, k −1 exemptions are granted and the kth is reneged with
some probability. The process is interrupted when u hits γi and the bank is paid. In the worst case scenario
(which happens with probability zero), l(i) defaults knock the bank in one stroke and its continuation utility
collapses to u = γi −
 l(i)−1
j=0 bi−j = bi−l(i) + θibi−l(i)−1. The scale factor θi is simply the probability of
survival faced by the bank following l(i) + 1 simultaneous defaults in the bliss state. An immediate default
for an encore and the pool is disposed of, since θ = 0 when u = bi−l(i)−1.
23The cut-oﬀ rule cannot be decremented by more than unit one looking forward. One special case7 arises
when r = 0 and l(i) = i−2. Since it makes no sense to defer payments when the bank is farsighted, investors
lose an instrument and are better oﬀ letting the bank cling to its target
 
j≤i bj anyway. There is no risk of
private beneﬁt diversion since it enjoys the highest possible rent. This may be very costly. Investors’ value
can actually be increased by assuming a deterministic cut-oﬀ rule. Such rule would trade oﬀ the disposal
of valuable assets against the saving on monitoring costs ex ante. Introducing deterministic liquidation
when r ≥ 0 would not qualitatively change our results, as the recursive solution would simply start from a
prespeciﬁed level.
An impatient bank is given a less ambitious target, but with time-varying size. If underlying individual
risk is expected to remain constant for some time, aggregate risk is declining and the size of probation tapers
oﬀ as losses unfold. This does not take the bank far away from target, since target and bank’s utility are
reduced jointly, but lowers payments in size-adjusted terms. If underlying risk is expected to deteriorate,
probation can be reset to a higher size. This worsens the bank’s position relative to target, but improves its
prospects if lucky enough to earn its way out of trouble.
4 Implementation
The optimal contract can be implemented with securitization under realistic assumptions. We consider a
true sale transaction, as we want the control rights to pass on to a third party, the issuing entity, which buys
the pool of loans with the proceeds of the sale of asset-backed securities to outside investors.
Consider a bank originating a pool of I identical long term loans. The bank seeks to maximize its proﬁts




s.t. K ≥ I − vI(u),
7The solution obtained by taking limits when r → 0 is well-deﬁned, with exponentials replacing power functions.
24shows that, when the constraint binds, social surplus S = u+vI(u)−I is maximized, implying u∗ = γI and
v∗ = vI(γI). This of course assumes that the bank has enough funds to start with, namely K = I − v∗.
The bank initiates an ABS transaction by selling the portfolio to a bankruptcy-remote trust with gain on
sale S over the principal balance I. The trust is willing to pay this premium because the anticipated payments
from the arrangement below ensure that it breaks even. The sponsoring bank then hires a servicer to conduct
due diligence on the borrowers. We consider only the relationship between the sponsoring bank/servicer on
the one hand and the trust on the other hand,8 leaving out further aspects concerning securitization, such
as consulting with credit agencies or underwriting new securities to outside investors.
Individual default intensities are sometimes taken piecewise constant in practice. Consider a CDO whose
attachment points track the changes in the actual distribution of individual risk under the risk-neutral
probability. Alternatively, estimate individual risk in exogenously given tranches. As long as it is constant,
the reservation utility bi = B/(ǫαi) is also ﬁxed. We assume that the tranches cover the whole spectrum of
losses. (More realistically a deterministic cut-oﬀ could be set at some lower end point; see above.) Under
systemic risk, the more senior the tranche, the worse its default characteristics.
A tranche [L,U] yields protection [N − L]
+ − [N − U]
+, where the diﬀerence between the attachment
points, U − L, is the notional size of the tranche. It reimburses losses between L and U, if any. Let bL,U
be the common reservation utility in that tranche. The protection embedded in a portfolio of tranches with











is just the sum of weights bj when j runs the gamut from full size j = I to the size one step ahead j = I−N+1.
From the previous section, bi is the utility forfeited by the bank when the portfolio size shrinks from i to
i − 1. Thus, the default-contingent exposure P(N) cumulates utility losses inﬂicted on the bank since the
beginning and rises from zero to a maximum of
 1
j=I bj. Its variation from state i to i − 1 is driven by the
8In the model, the servicer is aﬃliated with the sponsor and the two are treated on a consolidated basis. The servicer is
assured of the sponsor’s proﬁt and there is no agency problem between them.
25bank’s constant risk shares9 bi/  in the tranches. Over the ﬁrst-loss piece bI/  is close to one and the bank
takes the brunt of the losses to protect investors. Over the senior tranche, the bank is less exposed to default
risk and a larger fraction of losses is passed through to investors. According to the optimal contract, the
bank keeps sharing in the risk at a declining rate, until liquidation. This is in marked contrast with standard
practice in structured ﬁnance, where the common retention mechanism is one for the ﬁrst-loss piece and zero
for all other tranches. One arrangement works as follows.
Proposition 3 If individual risk is constant within tranches, the optimal risk prevention policy can be
implemented with securitization:
(i) Collateral u∗ = γI is withdrawn from the sale and posted in a reserve account managed by the trust;
(ii) The bank buys CDO tranches, weighted b = B/(ǫα), and waives its rights to the premium spreads;
(iii) The protection embedded in the tranches is assigned to the reserve account;
(iv) The servicing fee Bi/ǫ and accrued interests (rate r) are credited to the reserve account;
(v) The account balance is maintained between cap γi and ﬂoor bi:
– Excess cash triggers payment to the bank;
– Overdrafts trigger stochastic liquidation: the trust makes up for the shortfall if the pool is rescued, seizes
the account and settles outstanding CDOs if it is liquidated.
The trust incentivizes the bank by subordinating cashﬂows to its performance record. First, the sponsor
guarantees the deal by pledging u∗ = K + S out of the proceeds of the sale and places the funds in a
reserve account managed by the trust. Second, the bank writes protection by buying CDO tranches (CDS
style10) to match the optimal declining risk shares, using the reserve account as cash collateral. It does not
matter whether the buyers of protection are outside investors or the trust itself. What matters is that the
premium ﬂows generated by the credit enhancement do not accrue on the reserve account, lest the bank
were considered as a simple arbitrageur operating in the credit derivative market. Third, the servicing and
9Because only monitored ﬁnance is viable, the gains from monitoring  (λi(1 + ǫ) − λi) are always larger than the private
beneﬁts from shirking Bi. Thus bi = B/ǫαi <  .
10A CDS style deal involves no payment at inception: the premiums ﬂow in exchange for capital protection paid as and when
credit events occur; cf. Chaplin (2005).
26rent-preserving fees always remain at the top of the ﬂow of funds, whether they are directly remitted to
the bank or serve to replenish the reserve account. Earmarking a portion of the premium spreads allows
the trust to cater for the sponsor’s impatience with the same instruments as those used for the synthetic
compensation.
Finally, the trust monitors performance continuously by peeking at the bank’s cash position within
prescribed limits. Should the bank tread the stochastic liquidation interval, heightening solvency concerns,
a “regulator” with full commitment is called for. Were then the balance to fall beyond ﬂoor, the regulator
decides whether liquidation is warranted, perhaps on the basis of her superior information. The trust always
stands in for the problem bank, either settling with a cash payment if the pool is kept aﬂoat, or seizing the
account and insulating the buyers of protection from counterparty risk if allowed to go under. Since the
arrangement regulates liquidity as in the optimal incentive-compatible contract, the bank maximizes proﬁts
subject to its conducting due diligence on borrowers and the trust breaks even.
5 Policy implications
The cost of mortgage debt has increased dramatically in recent months. Ouside investors and overseas buyers
have backed away following concerns about the US housing market and uncertainty about the involvement of
the US government in the support of agency debt. The breakdown in the subprime mortgage market is due
in some part to informational frictions between borrowers, lenders and other key players in the securitization
process. While the paper doesn’t deal directly with the current crisis – systemic risk is modelled at the
individual bank level only and there is no interbank market or interdependencies between banks – it has
noteworthy implications. The overall punchline is that what we see may be more a ﬂaw of regulation than
one of securitization.
One issue is whether the ability to securitize changes the risk proﬁle of bank balance sheets in the ﬁrst
place. With on-balance sheet lending, banks are disciplined by a standard debt contract.11 The optimality
11One modern version of this view is that banks’ incentives are reinforced by the illiquidity of loans and the fragility of
demand deposits (Diamond and Rajan, 2003).
27of a standard debt contract when eﬀort is undertaken in the beginning follows from Innes (1990) and can be
viewed as an application of the principle of the deductible which, as recalled by Franke and Krahnen (2008),
is the “magic” trick of incentive alignement familiar from insurance contracts. In this world, banks that
originate bad loans bear the impact of losses up to a FLP and act as good delegated monitors. With the
business model of securitization, however, informational frictions that arise from two-tier and even multi-tier
agency relationships complicate the delegated monitoring problem. The risk of private beneﬁt diversion from
those committing their speciﬁc collection skills or administering the pool of assets becomes a real issue. One
ﬁrst implication of this paper is that when continuous monitoring is relevant the risk proﬁle of bank balance
sheets changes and incentive alignement can no longer be achieved by a standard debt contract. Ironically,
complex structured instruments deemed to be at the “heart” of the credit market woes provide a good basis
to pass risks on to third parties in good economic sense.
A second issue is whether securitization structures are suitably accounted for by Basel requirements.
Acharya and Schnabl (2008) argue that sponsoring banks were able to call something as oﬀ-balance sheet,
lower their capital charge, and thus operate at a higher leverage than regulators perceived. The prevailing
view among analysts is indeed that excessive leverage built up by banks has lead them to lend “down the
quality curve.”
One problem with the Securitization Framework concerns the treatment of second loss positions. Banks
are able to include their exposures in a second loss position or better in the calculation of their risk weighted
assets under relatively mild conditions.12 The paper suggests in contrast that all securitization exposures
provided by the sponsoring bank for credit enhancement should attract a deduction. The size of sponsoring
banks’ exposures to securitization tranches must decrease with their seniority, but theory gives no reason
why the regulatory treatment of second loss positions should be discounted relative to that of the ﬁrst-loss
position. This is especially true for the most senior exposure, for which the Basel requirements above are
waived altogether. According to the model, the most senior exposure is also risky because liquidation is
12Namely (i) the exposure is economically second loss position and the ﬁrst loss position provides signiﬁcant protection (ii)
the credit risk is rated investment grade (iii) the credit risk is unrated and the bank does not retain or provide the ﬁrst loss
position.
28possible before it starts suﬀering losses. Whether patient or not, a bank can also be subject to deterministic
liquidation when less than a given fraction remains outstanding. Certainly no tranche can be securitized in
that fraction. The fact that basis correlation can be found to be as high as one in the recent environment
seems indicative of faulty system design.
Another problem is that banks are not constrained to retain any substantial part of the risk and maintain
it over time. In a traditional securitization, a bank may exclude all assets from its risk-based capital
calculations, provided it complies with operational requirements prescribing that the assets remain beyond
its reach and that of its creditors. If the sponsoring bank does not retain any risk, the ownership is transferred
and there is no capital charge. This is the worst of all worlds, since Basel II recognizes that the sponsoring
bank may retain the “servicing rights to exposures” without it constituting “indirect control of the exposures”
and so remain in the possession of hidden information concerning the pool of assets. One might argue that
the price of a securitization transaction conveys information about the underlying quality of loans. But
disclosure of the amount paid for the pool is not required for assets that are not securities, on the ground
that such information is proprietary and in some instances not a meaningful concept; cf. Federal Register
(2005, IIIB3c).
A third issue is whether prudential regulation plays its role in ensuring that banks engage in optimal
CRT. Suppose that after funds have been raised from deposits and loans made, a bank engages in CRT
without being committed to the optimal plan. It can hold fewer junior tranches and more senior tranches
than necessary. In good states the bank receives high fees relative to the protection sold. It has a high
utility and keeps monitoring. In bad states the fees may fall short of the protection sold. The promise-
keeping constaint breaks down and the bank stops monitoring. The trust breaks even if this is factored in
the pricing, but the bank increases its revenue by shifting losses to depositors. As pointed out by Chiesa
(2008), prudential regulation may have a role in solving this commitment problem and restoring eﬃciency.
Casual evidence cited in Franke and Krahnen (2008) shows that “the allocation of risks in securitization
transactions is one of the well guarded secrecies of the industry”and that despite inconsistencies in empirical
studies “the observed risk transfer is probably quite diﬀerent from what theory predicts.” The paper concurs
29with Franke and Krahnen (2007) that “the actual allocation of these tranches to investors in the economy
is of particular relevance for bank supervisors.”
A fourth issue is that many structures do not have mark to market prices, and banks essentially mark
them to their advantage since they are compensated short-term with the very high coupon paid on the FLP13
and take out the capital needed to bear the risk in the long term. This is a problem of incentives rather
than of securitization per se. The bank is not entitled to receive the coupons generated by the protection it
extends. More importantly, the results of the paper suggest that capital requirements alone cannot correct
misaligned incentives, but that liquidity regulation may bring them back to the fold. A credit enhancement
mechanism based on a proper allocation of CDOs subordinates the cash ﬂows to overall performance, without
prejudice of the servicing fees which remain at the top of the ﬂow of funds. It is explicit, rather than based
on back-up credit lines or other forms of implicit support which overwhelm bank liquidity in crisis times. It
is prefunded with the proceeds of the sale, in the form of a reserve account managed by the trust, and thus
resembles capital insurance in that protection is called for upon the occurrence of losses. It is subject to a
regulatory charge, since the CDO premiums remain with the issuing trust, except for the fraction returned
as rent-preserving fees to the sponsors.
It is often suggested that one of the main issues with regard to Basel II is its focus on individual banks.
Given that banks will remain regulated at the individual level, regulators must include a measure of liquidity
risk induced by correlation in individual risk measures. The charge for liquidity risk embedded in the optimal
plan is based on loss intensities that can be calibrated from market imputs such as CDO tranche premiums.
It can be seen as a tax prepaid by sponsors for the contingent support they receive as a result of their
limited liability at the time of liquidation. When losses begin unfolding capital is automatically supplied by
sponsoring banks and the tax is high. Only in case of liquidation capital is overwhelmingly supplied by the
trust and the liquidity tax eventually eschewed.
13The cashﬂow “waterfall” implied by actual CDOs usually allocates loan income according to descending priority. Excess
interest payments from the mortgage pool are paid to the equity tranche holder provided some conditions, such as the interest
coverage or overcollateralization tests, are met. Such payments can arise in principle even when the equity tranche has been
used up; cf. Chaplin (2005).
306 Conclusion
While the literature generally considers endogenous liquidation values with exogenously given contracts
(Schleifer and Vishny, 1992), here we endogenize contracts with exogenously given liquidation values. Our
starting point is that among the various sources of informational frictions moral hazard may be as important
as adverse selection. Monitoring may consist either of screening borrowers to reduce the proportion of less
creditworthy types ex ante, or of services tailored to the borrowers to minimize the probability of losses down
the road. In the paper we deliberately play down the ﬁrst aspect and emphasize the second. Continuous
monitoring reduces defaults on bank loans just as continuous testing of students reduces the probability of
failure.14 Placed in the context of securitization, this means that one of the key frictions that may have
caused the subprime crisis is moral hazard between sponsors and servicers on the one hand and investors
and their trustees on the other. As should be clear from several references in the literature, the deﬁnition of
“servicer” does not only encompass the collection of the pool assets but also the maintenance and allocation
of the pool itself, functions that are often referred to as “administration.”
The model ﬁnds a role for supervision to the extent that losses are not permitted to exceed a prespeciﬁed
cut-oﬀ rule. Servicers would prefer to keep the loans on their books for as long as possible, as this would
increase the income they receive from the portfolio, and should be constrained in the amount of time they
are allowed to operate. Likewise, sponsors have an incentive to tilt their risk sharing towards retaining too
much senior risk and too little junior risk, and due diligence conducted by supervisors may help prevent
that. The model ﬁts in relatively well with current recommendations that the bankrupty code should be
amended to allow for regulatory intervention ahead of bank insolvency. But it strongly suggests that market
discipline might be better imposed by a well-designed credit enhancement scheme based on tranching than
simply outsourced to regulatory supervision.
14I am indebted to Robert Krainer (U. of Wisconsin) for the analogy.
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348 Proof of Proposition 3
From the bank’s integrated promise-keeping constraint (2) along the optimal path, we know that for all t ≤ τ







































since at t = τ the default count jumps from
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τ to I. Thus




























is the trust’s cumulated cost resulting from intervention after stochastic liquidation. With probability θ, the
project is maintained and the trust pays the shortfall ∆ξ = bi +bi−1 −u. With probability 1−θ the project
is terminated and the trust wins the residual balance −∆ξ = u − bi. Evaluating (5) at t = τ with uτ = 0
and Nτ = I, we get
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where i∗ = I −
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τ is the portfolio size at liquidation.















35The trust’s costs and beneﬁts in the course of the relationship are as follows
Cost Beneﬁt
























the ﬁrst equality by design, the second by arbitrage since at date τ, the pool is liquidated and Nτ = I. The
trust breaks even.
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